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In what sense is dreaming real to people of different cultures? How do they come to 
conclude that dreaming is real, and how do they use dreams to expand their knowledge 
and control of real events? The reader is introduced to dream anthropology and shown that 
there are universal patterns to how dreams are experienced, expressed, and used by societies. 
The distinction between monophasic and polyphasic cultures is described, the latter being 
the majority of societies that consider dreaming as being in some sense real. Neuroscience 
supports the notion that there is a natural realism behind the experience of reality in any 
and all alternative states of consciousness (ASC), and that whatever the ASC, there is a 
transcendental set of obduracies and affordances that condition the modeling, expression, 
and social interpretation of experiences, most especially those encountered in archetypal (or 
special) dreams.
, 32, 2013, pp. 64-78 
The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, 
because our attention then lapses from the sensible world. 
Conversely when we wake, the attention usually lapses from 
the dream-world and that becomes unreal. But if a dream 
haunts us and compels our attention during the day, it is 
very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort 
of sub-universe alongside of the waking world. Most people 
have probably had dreams which it is hard to imagine not to 
have been glimpses into an actually existing region of being...
—William James, The Principles of Psychology 
(1890/2007, p. 294)
All human beings on the planet sleep, and while asleep they dream. The people in most of the 4,000-plus cultures on the planet pay close 
attention to their dreams and consider them to be 
in some sense real. In what sense is dreaming real to 
peoples? How do they come to conclude that dreaming 
is real, and how do they use dreams to expand their 
knowledge about, and their control over, real events? 
In this article I will explore the reality of dreaming and 
present a neuroanthropological account explaining why 
most peoples treat dreaming as veridical.1 I will begin 
by making a crucial distinction between two types of 
culture, one of which predominates among the world’s 
traditional cultures. Also, it will be necessary to explore 
the phenomenological elements that contribute to 
experiencing dreaming as real before offering examples 
of such dream cultures and how they make use of 
the information obtained in dreams. I will conclude 
by suggesting a neuroanthropological explanation of 
why most peoples in the world consider dreaming as a 
domain of reality.
Monophasic and Polyphasic Cultures
Simply put, there are two types of cultures on the planet—monophasic and polyphasic (Laughlin, 
2011, pp. 62-66; Laughlin, McManus & d’Aquili, 1990, 
p. 293). In modern materialistic, technocratic societies, 
children are typically taught to disattend to their dreams 
and to focus on waking interactions with the external 
physical and social world (see Mageo, 2003b; Wax, 
2004). Children are taught from infancy that dreams are 
not real—that they are a fiction (“just a dream”)—and 
that they just happen for no apparent reason and can 
be ignored. Elementary schools typically do not address 
one’s dream life (see King, Welt, & Bulkeley, 2011), and 
information obtained in dreams, if any, bears little or 
no relevance to the waking world. Dreams, therefore, 
tend not to inform culture all that much, especially with 
respect to people’s spiritual life.2 These societies manifest 
what is called monophasic cultures (Laughlin, McManus, 
& d’Aquili, 1990, p. 293; Laughlin & Throop, 2001; 
McManus, Laughlin, & Shearer, 1993; LaHood, 2007; 
Lumpkin, 2001; Saniotis, 2010; Rodd, 2006) which tend 
to skew the development of consciousness away from 
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alternative states of consciousness (ASC) like dreaming, 
trance, drug trips, meditative states, visions, and other 
ritually-driven spiritual states, and toward what is 
thought of as “normal” waking perceptual and cognitive 
processes oriented outward to the external world. 
A monophasic orientation towards dreaming 
leaves its mark on sleep and dream research, as well as 
on the accounts of Western anthropologists for whom 
dreams usually have to be demythologized in some way 
in order for them to be meaningful—that is, the dream 
must make sense to rational thought in the waking 
state to make any sense at all (Tedlock, 1992b, p. 4; 
Bourguignon, 2003, p. 137). This Western bias in part 
explains: (1) why Freudian dream analysis has been 
so attractive to so many 20th century ethnographers, 
because one need not pay serious attention to the 
manifest content of dreams, or to the pragmatic, 
utilitarian repercussion of dreams, and (2) why a Jungian 
approach has generally been eschewed, for it requires 
some phenomenological sophistication on the part of 
the fieldworker to understand Jungian methods (see 
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012). 
Dreaming among people raised in the world’s 
modern industrial societies stands in sharp contrast to 
that of people living in most human societies on the 
planet—indeed, it stands in contrast to both Western 
society’s pre-industrial cultural history and that of other 
modern, industrial societies such as Japan, China, and 
Brazil, during which dreaming and dream interpretation 
were highly valued.3 Aside from these modern industrial 
societies, roughly 90% of traditional societies seek out 
and value experiences had in ASCs, and especially in 
dreams (Bourguignon, 1973; Bourguignon & Evascu, 
1977). These traditional societies are called polyphasic 
cultures, meaning that they value experiences had in the 
dream-life and in other ASCs (see Locke & Kelly, 1985). 
There appears to be a kind of watershed between the 
two extremes, in which disattention to ASCs altogether 
will produce an extremely monophasic standpoint from 
which identity and culture are associated, most likely 
caused by the enculturation prescribed by an extremely 
materialistic political economy. 
There are, of course, individuals—indeed 
there are even groups and professions—within Western 
society that are “into their dreams” to some extent, 
though usually in relation to one kind of psychotherapy 
or another (see, e.g., Edgar 1995). But polyphasic 
cultures are quite different from the ones to which 
most Westerners belong. These are societies in which 
dream experiences are conceived by people as different 
domains of reality, not as unreality. Indeed, most people 
on the planet, even those in monophasic cultures, rarely 
if ever make a distinction between experienced reality 
and extramental reality in their everyday lives. Their 
sense of identity incorporates memories of experiences 
had in dreams and other ASCs, as well as those had in 
waking life. People may in fact have no word in their 
native tongue that glosses “dream” in our English sense 
(Basso, 1992; Merrill, 1992, p. 199). What Westerners 
call a “dream” may be considered by others to be the 
polyphasic ego (soul, spirit, shadow, etc.) of a person 
experiencing another domain of reality during sleep.4 
Dream experiences, just as waking experiences, inform 
the society’s general system of knowledge about the self 
and the world, as well as the development of a person’s 
identity (see Ridington, Robin, & Ridington, 1970). 
One can thus understand why ethnographer Jean-
Guy Goulet’s (1998) hosts among the Guajiro (a South 
American people) would not allow him to live with them 
unless he “knew how to dream” (p. 22). One may also 
understand why the anthropology of dreaming has for 
generations focused upon polyphasic cultures, perhaps 
because they are so at-odds with Western everyday, 
materialist expectations, and because the experiences 
they relate to from their alternative states appears so 
exotic to the Western perspective. 
Phenomenology of Dreaming
Before examining the nature and experience of reality, and constructing an explanation of why 
peoples across the planet consider dreaming real, it is 
helpful to ground this discussion in the phenomenology 
of dream reality—that is, what is it about the experience 
of dreaming that people in so many societies find actual, 
compelling, informative, and useful. This can begin 
by delimiting aspects of dreaming that are universal to 
people everywhere.
Indiscernibility
If one brackets (i.e., sets aside one’s belief in) the 
reality of waking life and the unreality of dream life, the 
two life-worlds are “indiscernible” (Globus, 1987; see also 
Kirtsoglou, 2010, p. 323). Both dreaming and waking 
worlds are grounded in pure experience and solely on 
that basis one cannot tell them apart—they are equally 
domains of lived experience (i.e., they are life-worlds), 
and must be studied as such.5 This phenomenological 
finding makes a lot of sense neurophysiologically, for 
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both dream and waking experience are mediated by 
the same sensorium—that is, most of the brain systems 
that mediate waking experiences also mediate dream 
experiences (Pagel, 2008, p. 63).6 This finding also makes 
ethnographic sense because so many of the peoples 
ethnographers have lived amongst and studied consider 
dreaming to be just as real as waking.7 
Is it possible to tell dreaming and waking apart 
on other grounds? Yes: 
The answer here is that the differences [one’s] 
reflection notes are not fundamental but related to 
sensory functions, which are highly restricted in 
sleep and open during waking. The dream life is like 
the wake life, except that there is no flowing array of 
sensory stimulation available to modulate it. As lived, 
the dream life is an authentic life, but reflection 
reveals that it is a peculiar unmodulated life because 
of the sensory restriction. (Globus, 1987, p. 65). 
While dreaming, people actually perceive “people,” 
“plants,” “animals,” and “clouds” as being real. They 
are right there before the mind’s eye. In the dream one 
reacts and interacts with these images because they are 
real in that life-world (Craig, 1987). What else can be 
discerned about dreams relative to waking experiences? 
Globus (1987) suggested that there is a distinct “single-
mindedness” about dreams. Dreams tend to proceed 
along a single train of thought, as opposed to waking life 
where there are many more distractions and alternative 
possibilities. 
Apodicticity
Ethnologists often speak of a people’s “beliefs” 
with respect to the culture’s local knowledge. Under 
certain circumstances, this way of referring to local 
knowledge makes sense, for it allows the fieldworker 
to dodge any question of the truth-value of the hosts’ 
ethnoepistemology—that is, a people’s own theory of 
how they come to know what they claim to know (see 
Hongladarom, 2002). Yet this approach to local know-
ledge also distorts the phenomenology of knowing, for 
the way Western English-speakers use the word “belief” 
tends to imply a hedge on certainty of knowledge—as 
in, “well, I believe so,” or “that was what she believed 
anyway.” One thing that is lost in using the term “belief” 
to label local knowledge is the sense of apodicticity8 that 
may accompany an act of knowing among the people 
who are studied. For most peoples, there is no suggestion 
that dreaming is fantasy or fiction. “Rather, they take 
them to be literal experiences of the dreamer’s soul—as 
[Edward B.] Tylor first proposed—the gripping reality 
of a dream while it is being experienced is certainly 
a powerful reinforcement of the idea in the waking 
afterthought” (Tuzin, 1975, p. 563).
Goulet (1987) took up the distinction between 
belief and knowledge with regard to Dene Tha ways of 
knowing: 
Among the Dene Tha, as among other Northern 
Athapaskans, knowledge that has been mediated is 
regarded with doubt. True knowledge is considered 
to be that which is derived from experience. . . . 
This view has profound implications for what Dene 
consider the proper way to teach or inform not only 
their children and each other, but also the inquisitive 
ethnographer approaching them to learn about their 
ways and their religion. (pp. 115-116) 
In other words, the Dene Tha value knowledge from 
direct experience, regardless of the state of consciousness 
during which the knowledge is derived. Only through 
direct experience can one achieve that sense of the 
apodicticity of knowledge. In Dene terms, if I know 
something, I know it because I experienced it, and an 
ingredient of the experience is the immediate sense of 
apodicticity—the certainty that “this is the case,” or 
“this is not the case.” This is less a logical and more an 
existential certainty. 
The Dene Tha are quite forthright about the 
dependence of true knowledge upon experience—
namely, they choose not to share knowledge with anyone 
unprepared to understand it. 
Dene tend to exclude those who are not perceived 
as knowing from those among whom they discuss 
experiences of dreams, visions, and power. Such 
discussion occurs only between those who are “in 
the know.” To one who “knows” and understands, 
Dene offer a degree of explanation according to 
their estimation of his or her understanding. This 
estimation of the ethnographer’s “knowledge,” 
more than the investigator’s own research agenda, 
determines the flow of information between the 
two, information that most often takes the form 
of stories, the significance of which at first simply 
escapes the ethnographer. (Goulet, 1987, p. 114)
As Goulet (1994) put it, “true knowledge is personal 
knowledge” (p. 114) and the only access to knowledge 
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gleaned from dreaming is by way of learning the skills 
of the dreamer.
Revealing the Hidden
When one brackets the belief in the unreality 
of dreams, one is better able to appreciate one very 
significant and universal pattern in the phenomenology 
of dreaming cross-culturally—that in dreams, entities 
and forces that are normally invisible to waking life may 
become sensible, tangible, and even palpable during 
dreaming (see Sumegi, 2008, p. 31). For example, 
Meggitt (1962) noted that among the Mae Enga of 
New Guinea, ghosts are invisible while one is awake, 
but visible in dreams. There are innumerable examples 
of societies in which dead ancestors, mere shades or 
shadows during the waking state, become significant 
characters and causal agents in dreams. Irving Hallowell 
(1960/2002), in reflecting upon the world view of the 
Ojibwa Indians, spoke of “other-than-human persons” 
encountered within dreams. He noted, “While in all 
cultures ‘persons’ comprise one of the major classes of 
objects to which the self must become oriented, this 
category of being is by no means limited to human 
beings. In Western culture, as in others, ‘supernatural’ 
beings are recognized as ‘persons,’ although belonging, 
at the same time, to the other than human category” (p. 
20).
Ethnographers often find that in their hosts’ 
world, they do not merely “believe” in other-than-human 
persons, but actually know them. They know them 
because they encounter them and interact with them in 
their dream life. This factor is of primary importance to 
cross-cultural dream research. It is what Goulet (1998) is 
getting at when he wrote:
I agree with [Clifford] Geertz that we can neither live 
other people’s lives nor magically intrude on their 
consciousness, whether members of our own culture 
or of another. But to see the task of the ethnographer 
as Geertz defines it precludes some of what we can 
do and learn in the field, not only about others but 
also about ourselves in our interaction with them. 
Ethnographic work can—but does not need to—go 
hand in hand with the anthropologist’s experience 
of dreams and visions. These often become part 
of interactions with others. . . . More than merely 
listen to what others say about their lives, then, 
anthropologists pay attention to their own lives, 
including their inner lives. They observe and listen 
to other people’s responses to their accounts of 
their own dreams and/or visions experienced while 
living among these others. To do so is to become an 
experiential ethnographer. (p. 254)
Predicting the Future
Dreams are a ubiquitous source of information, 
not only about the self, but about future events (Goulet, 
1998, pp. xxvii-xxix). People everywhere want to know 
what is going to happen before it does happen—thus 
removing a major source of uncertainty, anxiety, and 
stress.9 Some wake up in the morning and tune in to 
the weather report so that they do not go out into foul 
weather unprepared. Yet everyone knows how inaccurate 
weather reports can be. So too may the precognition 
of events in a dream be questionable. Many peoples 
evaluate the accuracy of divinatory dreams by waiting 
to see if the predicted results actually happen—in other 
words, they use post hoc reasoning (Krippner, 1994).10 
The Lacandon Maya take a “wait-and-see” 
attitude toward such dreams. Robert Bruce (1975) 
demonstrated this attitude by recording dreams and 
then seeing how the people interpret the prediction 
relative to what happens later on—whether or not the 
dream is confirmed as “predictive.” For instance:
Dream: Mateo (Sr.) of Najá dreamed of two domestic 
pigs, and later of kitam (collared peccary).
Interpretation: Foreigners are coming, and there will 
be two of them. . . .
Confirmation: Not confirmed . . . unless (as is 
often the case) it was remembered long enough to 
be rationalized upon arrival of the next foreigners, 
weeks later. (p. 45)
Or again:
Dream: [On June 7] Antonio (first son-in-law of 
Chan K’in of Najá) dreamed of Augusto de la Cruz, 
of a Tzeltal family living in El Carmen, coming to 
sell bread.
Interpretation: The person in question is thought to 
be of the deer Onen, so may foretell seeing a deer.
Confirmation: June 9, K’in Bol (son-in-law in service 
to Chan K’in of Najá) killed a deer. (p. 49)
Goulet (1998; pp. 155-159) noted that the Dene 
Tha consider precognition in dreams as commonplace—
what they call “knowing with the mind.” “Dreaming 
in this manner, one knows where to go to kill a moose, 
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discerns if a medicine fight has ended with the destruction 
of the power of the enemy, or learns that deceased 
relatives are well and happy in the other land” (p. 156). 
Goulet (1998) related an interesting story about a Dene 
Tha woman who quite suddenly suffered insomnia for 
two nights; she told her sister about it and her sister sent 
her to a local healer.
 
The healer responded with the narration of a dream 
he had had two nights before. The dream was for a 
woman who was to visit him for help. In the dream 
the healer set his snares for beavers. Beavers came up 
to the snares but did not get caught. In his dream he 
had seen lots of clothes just scattered around; some 
were burnt, and others were still smoking. There 
was also a wolf around the area. When he woke up 
he wondered why he had had that dream. He told 
the sick woman that most people in the community 
looked after their things well. (p. 160) 
The patient then confessed that when her son had 
refurbished the attic of their house, he had thrown some 
of her old clothes downstairs. She was told to take care of 
them, but she didn’t. Instead, some kids gathered them 
up and took them outside and burned them in the yard. 
The healer then told the patient that she had become ill 
because she should have done the proper thing, and not 
just what she felt like doing. In Dene Tha psychology, 
there is a close symbolic association between clothing 
and the self (Goulet, 1998, p. 99).
The very idea that dreams may actually foretell 
future events flies in the face of modern Western 
mechanistic and technocratic conditioning about 
causation. The notion that one can “see into the future” 
violates the commonsense model in which event A 
causes event B, where A happens before B, and not 
vice-versa. Yet, well-controlled scientific experiments 
have demonstrated both precognition (or “future 
sight”),11 and causation at a distance and backwards 
causation.12 For instance, psychologist David Ryback 
(1988) investigated precognitive dreaming in college 
students. He administered a questionnaire to over 433 
subjects and found that 290 (66.9%) reported some kind 
of paranormal dream. Although he ended up dropping 
many of these claims as unfounded, he did conclude that 
8.8% of the population did in fact have precognitive 
dreams (see also Rhine, 1969). 
In a series of ingenious experiments, Dean 
Radin (1997b; see also 2006, Ch. 10) and D. J. Bierman 
(Bierman & Radin, 1997, 1999) have demonstrated 
a robust precognition or “presentiment” effect using 
physiological indicators of “precognitive information” 
when subjects act before they are presented with a 
random stimulus. Here’s how the experiments work. The 
subject sits alone in a room in a comfortable chair and 
is “wired-up” to machines that measure the activity of 
their autonomic system, and hence their emotional state. 
When the subject is ready, they push a button and around 
seven seconds later a random image is shown on a screen. 
The image may be of a calming nature, or may be highly 
emotional (violent or erotic). A computer decides which 
picture to show after the subject pushes the button. Each 
subject does this a set number of times. Results showed 
that subjects tend to respond emotionally several seconds 
before the picture appears, and the correlation between 
measures of emotional reaction and highly emotional 
imagery is significant. Bierman and Scholte (2002) took 
this research even further by carrying it out on subjects 
while their brains were being scanned using a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine. Again, 
they showed that areas mediating appropriate emotion 
(calm or intense feeling) became active before the 
randomized image was shown. 
This kind of research is by its very nature 
controversial among Western academics. Arguments 
rage over whether or not a “presentiment effect” exists 
or not. It would be interesting to know with absolute 
certainty that precognitive dreams actually happen or 
not in experimental situations. But in the sense in which 
precognitive or “presentiment” dreams in anthropology 
are spoken of, it is less important whether they actually 
foretell events, and more important that informants and 
the societies being researched experience presentiments 
as real and act upon them—an ethnographic reminder 
of the old W. I. Thomas theorem: “It is not important 
whether or not the interpretation is correct—if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 572). As 
demonstrated here, most polyphasic societies do believe 
in and experience precognitive dreaming, however 
empirical or skeptical they may be of any particular 
incidence of it. 
Ethnographic information is commonly 
anecdotal descriptions and self-reports. Take for instance 
ethnographer Edith Turner’s (1996) precognitive dream 
experiences while doing fieldwork among the Iñupiat 
people of northern Alaska. On October 5th she recorded 
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a “waking” dream she had in which she “saw a man who 
was having to carry a whole pile of stuff like window 
glass—it had something to do with my house” (p. 38). 
On November 26th, she had an intruder who broke into 
her basement by breaking a window (p. 80), and then 
on December 7th the trash man arrived. “I showed him 
the sheets of broken glass in the furnace room. He lifted 
them carefully and carried them out of the house to the 
truck. Immediately my waking dream of October 5 
came back to me—a distinct picture of a man carrying a 
whole pile of stuff like window glass” (p. 83). For Turner, 
this break-in and glass removal were a “disturbance” that 
was presaged in dream.
Special Dreams
Most peoples distinguish between normal 
everyday dreaming, and the occasional special dream 
that has much greater significance. J. S. Lincoln (1935) in 
his classic book, The Dream in Primitive Culture, called 
the latter type a culture pattern dream (p. 22), similar to 
what others have referred to as special, “big,” archetypal, 
titanic, significant, or memorable dreams. “These dreams 
may be rare in the dream lives of most people, yet they 
surely occur to many as memorable exceptions. Some, 
like [C. G.] Jung and tribal shamans, seem to dream in 
an archetypal style characteristically. The major defining 
feature of these dreams, part and parcel of their uncanny-
numinous quality and aesthetically rich structure, is the 
powerful sense of felt meaning and portent conveyed 
directly within the dream” (p. 129). 
Benjamine Kilborne (1992) has suggested 
that the degree of elaboration of dream classification 
in a society may be proportional to the importance 
of dreaming in that society. Although there are no 
holocultural data as yet to support this assertion, it does 
make some sense, for that is the strong impression one has 
from the ethnographic literature on polyphasic peoples. 
In any event, Kilborne shows that modern Moroccans 
hold the distinction between true dreams that are 
divinely inspired, and false or deceitful dreams derived 
from other sources (p. 185). Dream categories vary 
with the informant, but may seem to consider dreams 
divisible into: (1) message dreams—divinatory dreams 
dreamt in holy places; (2) warning dreams—messages 
received from ancestors, and others, offering advice 
and cautions about the future, essentially divinatory 
dreams; (3) preoccupation dreams—dreams driven by 
internal positive or negative emotions; and (4) normal 
(“day residue”) dreams—problem solving dreams, and 
so on. Only the first category is considered true beyond 
question, for they derive from Allah and true dreams are 
associated with safety and harmony, while false dreams 
may derive from the djinn spirits who may be good or 
bad, and may be harmful and destructive.
Neural Models and Dreaming
Psychological anthropologists have focused most of their attention upon the psychiatric, psychodynamic, 
spiritual, social-sharing, and self-oriented issues of 
dreaming. However, because ethnologists tend to be 
humanists and not natural scientists, their training in 
the neurosciences is usually minimal, at best. As a result, 
modern ethnological theories of dreaming are rather 
thin on the ground, and very few approaches are able to 
integrate evolutionary psychological and neurobiological 
perspectives into their formulations (Whitehouse, 2001, 
p. 1). There are refreshing exceptions, of course. Murray 
L. Wax (1998, 2004) has thought about dreaming in 
both its neurobiological and its sociocultural contexts 
and has noted that modern neuroscience removes the 
experience of dreaming from the limited context of the 
intimate social relations and ethos of the dreamer and 
re-frames dreaming as a cognitive process: 
Current neuropsychological research addresses 
behavior and mental processes attributed to the 
brain regarded as a wet computer. . . . Research 
attention is deflected from the relationships and 
responsibilities of social interaction and toward 
cognitive process. Yet viewed historically, the facts 
are that human beings at all times and places have 
required sleep and engaged in dreaming. From an 
evolutionary perspective, this is striking. What 
functions are thereby being served? (Wax, 2004, p. 
86) 
This view is useful, for it acknowledges a perspective 
that can treat both the sociocultural and evolutionary 
neurobiological aspects of dreaming from a single 
vantage point. This is the approach my colleagues and I 
have used for the past forty years toward such problems 
as the relations between cognized and extramental reality 
(Laughlin & D’Aquili, 1974; Laughlin, McManus, 
& D’Aquili, 1990), ethno-epistemology (Rubinstein, 
Laughlin, & McManus, 1984), ritual (d’Aquili, 
Laughlin, & McManus, 1979), cultural adaptation 
(Laughlin & Brady, 1978) and dreaming (Laughlin, 
2011). This approach offers a quite different angle on 
the relationship between dreaming and reality. This 
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relationship is not merely a philosophical issue, for, as 
seen above, most human societies consider dreaming as real. 
Naturalist Realism
I approach mind-reality relations from a 
standpoint very similar to Clifford Hooker’s (1995) 
naturalist realism (pp. 15-18). I do so a bit sheepishly, for 
I identify completely with Michael Devitt (1991) when 
he wrote, “There is something a little shameful about 
spending one’s time defending something so apparently 
humdrum as the independent existence of the familiar 
world. But the provocations are so great, and my flesh is 
too weak” (p. vii). This chagrin is mirrored by philosopher 
Moritz Schlick (1991) when he noted: “I must confess 
that I should charge with folly and reject a limine every 
philosophical system that involved the claim that clouds 
and stars, mountains and the sea, were not actually real, 
that the ‘physical world’ did not exist, and that the chair 
against the wall ceases to be every time I turn my back 
on it” (p. 47). Critiquing those philosophers who would 
reduce reality to sensations, concepts, or experiences, 
Schlick went on to give an excellent definition of reality: 
“When [we realists] use the word ‘reality,’ we mean by it 
something quite different than you. Your definition of 
the real reduces it to experiences; but we mean something 
quite independent of all experiences. We mean [by 
reality] something that possesses the same independence 
that you obviously concede only to the data, in that 
you reduce everything else to them, as the not-further-
reducible” (p. 48). 
Brains Model Reality
It seems perfectly obvious that there is an 
independently existing extramental reality,13 a world 
within which Homo sapiens have evolved. It also seems 
obvious that human beings have brains in their heads, 
and like other animals with brains, their neural systems 
develop models of extramental reality and integrate 
those models within an experiential reality that informs 
knowledge and actions (Laughlin & Loubser, 2010; 
Laughlin, McManus, & D’Aquili, 1990; Koch, 2004). 
These models are clearly influenced in their development 
to varying degrees by inheritance and culture, as well as 
the interaction between models and reality (D’Andrade, 
1995; Donald, 1991, 2002; Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974; 
Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili, 1990; Shore, 1996; 
Sperber, 2001). Models of extramental reality consist 
of neural circuits that operate when individual neural 
cells make contact with each other and form a system 
or network. Neurons are cells that specialize in reaching 
out, touching (synapsing upon) and influencing the 
electrochemical activity of other cells. In this way, neural 
circuits constitute neural networks that mediate mental 
objects (images, feelings, sensory patterns, phenomenal 
relations, etc.) and meaning. 
Symbolic Penetration
All objects before the mind operate as symbols, 
for they penetrate into the fields of neural circuits 
mediating meaning associated with the object—what 
is called symbolic penetration (Laughlin, McManus, 
& d’Aquili, 1990, pp. 189-195). Sensory objects and 
mental images operate like a child’s magnet that, when 
placed under a piece of paper upon which iron filings 
are sprinkled, magnetically connect with (“penetrate 
to”) the iron filings and organize them, and then move 
them around as the magnet itself is moved. Turn the 
paper over and all one sees is the magnet (the image), yet 
below the surface of the paper there is the organization 
of iron filings—the field of meaning(s) associated with 
the magnet-as-symbol. Neural models are organic, of 
course, and operate both to assimilate information about 
reality (models determine perceptions and actions), and 
to accommodate themselves to the experience of reality 
(models are adjusted to information coming from reality 
feedback; Piaget, 1977, 1980; see also Block, 1982). This 
adjustment process, which may be called the truing of 
models, is ongoing from womb to grave, and is one that 
is inherited from a long phylogenetic past. Truing of 
models involves altering, eliminating, and strengthening 
the synaptic circuitry comprising the models (Changeux, 
1985; LeDoux, 2003)—removing some iron filings and 
adding others. Over the course of development, the 
field of meaning that is the model becomes larger, more 
complex, more veridical, and more stable as the brain 
grows.
The neural modeling function of the brain is an 
ancient one. Indeed, the brains of all animals operate in 
much the same way, regardless of how primitive they may 
be. Neural models must both feed-forward into reality 
(anticipate events) and must be capable of plasticity, 
growth, and change in order to remain adaptive to a 
dynamic environment over time. For example, James 
L. Gould (1986; see also Seeley, 2010) has shown that 
honeybees operate upon an internal cognitive map of 
their landscape, and that the younger the worker bee, the 
closer it remains to the hive during the bee’s foraging. 
It takes time for its cognized landscape to develop such 
that a worker can effectively forage further afield and 
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unfailingly find its way home. It would be immediately 
advantageous to an animal for a perceptual/pseudo-
perceptual image to “stand for” and evoke its associated 
meaning in memory, and to be the basis of action, 
rather than have to seek more information from the 
environment before acting. As Seligman and Hager 
(1972) pointed out years ago, some images are already 
“wired into” the brains of animals so that only one 
or a few sensory encounters with the corresponding 
bit of reality will suffice to activate inherent meaning 
and response schemes, and set them on the course of 
development. 
Neural models never develop from a random 
collection of nerve cells—that is, the brain is at no time 
in its ontogenesis a “blank slate” (see Pinker, 1997, 2003, 
on this issue). The neonatal brain is not a hodge-podge 
of cells all waiting to be assigned a function. Rather, the 
brain is organized from its first appearance in gestation, 
and just increases its vastly complex organization of neural 
networks as the fetus, neonate, infant, and child develop. 
Yes, there is plasticity (flexibility, ability to change) in 
all neural structures, but plasticity is always limited and 
varies in its pliancy depending upon how dedicated is 
the function of the model (see LeDoux, 2003, pp. 8-9) 
and the neurons that compose it (Ebbesson, 1984). 
For instance, networks comprising primary sensory 
association areas are less plastic than, say, networks in 
the secondary sensory association cortex of the brain 
that may get involved in mediating synesthesia or other 
higher functions.
Neurognostic Models
Virtually all neural models begin to operate 
as soon as they are organized—they are living cells 
that organize themselves into organic circuits, not 
microchips. Neural models begin as nascent structures 
that function in a rudimentary way as models, and those 
models that are involved with knowing reality begin 
life as what is called neurognosis (or neurognostic models) 
—as species-specific, primitive knowledge about the 
world and self that is “already there” in a very human 
way before enculturation begins (Carey, 2009, p. 67; 
Gazzaniga, 2000; Pinker, 1997). As neuroscientist Dale 
Purves (2010) noted:
the circuitry of nervous systems such as ours has 
evolved to contend with one fundamental challenge: 
How to generate useful perceptions and behaviors 
in response to a world that is unknowable directly 
by means of sensory stimuli. The strategy that has 
emerged to deal with this problem is governed by 
history, not logical principles or algorithms. Based 
on feedback from the empirical consequences 
of behavior, accumulated information about 
operational success is realized over evolutionary time 
in inherited neural circuitry whose organization 
is then modified to a limited extent by individual 
experience. (p. 233)
This neural circuitry forms models that have 
been passed down through our human DNA and are 
configured during neurogenesis under the direction of 
genetic inheritance.14 Neurognostic models mediate the 
nascent cognitive-perceptual stance to experience, and 
from that stance begins active exploration of self and 
world—modifying, growing, and developing models in 
response to feedback from the world (Miller, Galanter, 
& Pribram, 1960). Neurognostic models are virtually 
synonymous with what C. G. Jung referred to as 
“archetypes” (Stevens, 1982).
Depending upon the physical and cultural 
environment, some neurognostic models will develop 
and others remain relatively undeveloped, and some 
may even die (Changeux, 1985; LeDoux, 2003, pp. 80-
82; Katz & Shatz, 1996). Some models mediate thought 
while others mediate images, feelings, percepts, et cetera, 
and their respective development is highly influenced by 
culture. In a neurobiological sense, the anthropological 
term “enculturation” refers to the social influence 
upon neurocognitive development. For instance, a 
baby is born perceiving faces because there are areas 
of the cortex that are neurognostically structured to 
process faces. Enculturation molds the development of 
these models so that recognition of specific faces and 
meanings associated with various faces, and perhaps 
masks, become literally “in-formed” (Varela, 1979)—
associated by way of neural growth and new synaptic 
connections with other cells mediating memory. 
Reality as Obduracy and Affordancy
Human beings have evolved from a long line of 
social primates. All animals with brains operate upon 
their own inner cognized world—a world of experience 
mediated by their system of neural models (Laughlin & 
d’Aquili, 1974; see also Donald, 1991). Social animals are 
equipped with brains that are “wired” to know reality in 
a communal way (Dunbar, Gamble, & Gowlett, 2010). 
How then do humans know when an experience is 
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real—and know reality in a socially communal way? The 
answer is, the brains of all animals are neurognostically 
“pre-wired” to accept the limits of extramental reality 
while they are awake—limits that exhibit the twin 
qualities of obduracy and affordancy. The term obduracy 
generally means the characteristic of reality to resist the 
will and intentions of the psyche. If one attempts to push 
a finger through a marble table top, one will come up 
against the obdurate nature of reality. While one may 
dream or fantasize that one is flying without mechanical 
help, attempts to do so while awake will prove disastrous. 
Much of early development in the baby has to do with 
exploring the somatosensory limits of obduracy—the 
obduracy of the baby’s environment and of her or his 
own body (Piaget, 1980).
The other quality of extramental reality is 
affordancy, a term coined by the great perceptual 
psychologist James J. Gibson (1979, 1982), for the 
interaction between experience and what is allowed by 
extramental reality. “Roughly, the affordances of things 
are what they furnish, for good or ill, that is, what they 
afford the observer” (Gibson, 1982, p. 401). Again, “the 
affordances of the environment are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” 
(Gibson, 1979, p. 127). The development of knowledge 
about the world is in part a process of discovering and 
memorizing what things in reality afford the animal. 
What the brain comes to know are the particular 
qualities that further the animal’s ability to utilize its 
environment. Obviously then, what the world affords 
an animal depends upon the nature and structure of the 
animal. A stick lying over a stream may afford adequate 
support for a squirrel or an ant wishing to cross over, 
but not for a large dog. Flowers afford electromagnetic 
information in the ultraviolet range for honeybees, but 
not for people. Just consider the enormous variety of 
objects in the world that people call “chairs” because 
they afford sit-ability. If the object is not sit-able, then a 
person is not likely to perceive it as a “chair.”
Obduracy and affordancy are actually obverse 
qualities of extramental reality in relation to the structure 
and limitations of the animal’s body and its nervous 
system. Both the body and the world present obdurations 
and affordances that condition our intentionality, 
and thus operate to limit, guide and inform learning 
about one’s body and the world. One encounters these 
qualities daily, as do all animals with neurocognitive 
systems. One only become aware of them when running 
up against either their resistance to one’s intentions or 
new opportunities. Once one has adapted to (trued the 
models of) obdurate and affording aspects of the world, 
one generally loses awareness of the distinction between 
one’s experience of reality and extramental reality itself. 
This is an extremely important factor, for most people 
consider the world as experienced as real—in other words, 
most people do not make a practical distinction between 
ontology and epistemology the way many philosophers 
and metaphysicians do. 
Dreaming and the Transcendental Self
Being asleep in part means that the perceptual-
behavioral circuits that operate in waking states shuts 
down during dreaming—that is of course what makes 
dreaming so “paradoxical.” But this does not mean that 
consciousness is freed from the press of reality. Far from 
it, for what the dreamer encounters are the obduracy and 
affordancy generated by her or his own transcendental 
self—that is, the internal neurobiological structures 
mediating the sleeping life-world of the brain, including 
the available, species-specific functions of the nervous 
system, its inherent creativity, and its imaging capabilities 
(e.g., honeybees may dream in ultraviolet and electric eels 
may dream of non-visual electromagnetic fields, whereas 
humans can do neither). While dreaming one experiences 
one’s own self-obduracy. Dreams for instance never lie. In 
all of the dreaming experiences and research I have done 
over a half century, I have never encountered a deceptive 
dream. I have of course encountered “trickster” elements 
that have operated to fuzzify, obfuscate, or even hide 
relations and distinctions. “Shape-shifting” elements 
may arise that appear to be one thing and then become 
another (e.g., the goddess who transforms before the 
dreamer into a demon). In addition, my interpretations of 
dream material may be downright wrong as later dream 
work may point up. And I have dreamed that “I” (my 
dream ego) attempted to dissemble, or to deceive others, 
but in all of these situations the dream itself unfailingly 
tells the truth about what is happening in my greater self 
at the moment. 
In Douglas Hollan’s (2003, 2004) term, dreams 
are selfscapes—they are imagined depictions of what is 
happening in the self at the time of the dream. Also, 
baring extreme lucidity, one exercises very little if any 
control over dreaming—things just happen to one as a 
watcher or participant. One has little or no control over 
the course of dreamed events. Yet most people feel more 
or less in control of their waking lives, when much of what 
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is experienced is due directly to intentions and actions. 
Those who have experimented with lucid dreaming know 
that one can learn to have considerably more control over 
dream adventures and can form waking intentions to 
have certain experiences arise while dreaming (LaBerge, 
1980)—and can even communicate in a crude fashion 
with researchers from within the dream state (LaBerge, 
Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone, 1981). There is considerable 
evidence that this kind of control is exercised by shamans 
and healers when they use dreams to enter other domains 
of reality (Winkelman, 2010). However, it is fair to say 
that most people do not seek and do not experience this 
level of dream control. 
In addition, the images that arise in dreams 
tend to perfect themselves. Any blemishes, distortions, 
cracks, splotches, et cetera, that might be present in 
waking perception tend to disappear in dreams, be those 
archetypal images or “day residue” images. The image 
taken by spirits tend to be perfect in every way. If they 
are gods, goddesses, angels and the like, they may be 
perfectly beautiful. If on the other hand they are demons, 
nixies, monsters, et cetera, they tend to be perfectly 
horrible and terrifying. They are, in other words, the 
quintessence of whatever is being projected out of the 
unconscious, without the moderating and leavening 
effect of external perception.
Transcendental Obduracy 
and Affordancy in Dreams
Dreams afford revelation of the hidden, the 
invisible—the imagined causal connections between 
things that are normally unavailable to waking perception. 
Like the wind and ocean currents, causation may remain 
invisible to waking perception, but may become sensible 
in dreams because one can imagine them without 
bumping up against external sensory obduracy. Thus, 
in a sense, dreams afford us with cosmic confabulation, 
filling in the gaps in memories of waking experience. 
As one consequence, dreaming facilitates construction 
and rehearsal of alternative solutions to problems 
without immediate censure from outer extramental 
reality (Donald 1995; Nielsen, 2011; Revonsuo, 2000, 
2006). Another consequence is that a broader range of 
information may be presented to dreaming consciousness 
pertaining to the transcendental self, material that might 
otherwise interfere with adaptation to the external world 
while awake. This is why Jung considered dream work 
so fundamental to advanced individuation. Everybody 
individuates, but those who take a conscious role in 
their own individuation become far more complex 
personalities.
 Special dreams (culture pattern dreams) are 
commonly archetypal in content. Given freedom from 
external contingencies, the neurognostic structures of 
the brain are freed up to generate intuitions and images 
that represent the dynamic relations deep in the psyche 
of the dreamer (Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012). It is entirely 
possible that, because of cellular interactions with the 
quantum universe, archetypal dream imagery may be 
produced by events outside the brain of the dreamer, 
as in co-dreaming, prescient dreaming, and so forth 
(Laughlin & Throop, 2001).
Conclusion
Most societies on the planet consider dream experiences as being as real as waking 
experiences. Phenomenological evidence suggests a 
range of universal attributes of dream experiences upon 
which the reality of dreaming relies. The human brain 
is designed to operate by seeking and modeling patterns 
in experience, and to project those patterns upon the 
transcendental nature of reality, regardless of the ASC 
in which the experience arises. The ability of the psyche 
to generate intuitive and imaginal knowledge about 
causation, as well as anticipation of future events, 
and explanations of past events, operates to alleviate 
the uncertainty and anxiety people fear when causal 
relations are complex and hidden from everyday waking 
consciousness. Small wonder then that most traditional 
and non-technocratic peoples embrace their dream lives 
as a font of information of great relevance to the waking 
world. Not the least reason for this is the revelation for 
the dreamer of her or his own internal psychodynamics 
in an ASC which suspends the immediacy of external 
adaptations.
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Notes 
1.     Over the last several decades the anthropology of 
dreaming has taken firm hold and has to some 
extent systematized the wealth of ethnographic data 
on dreaming cross-culturally (Kennedy & Langness, 
1981; Laughlin, 2011; Lohmann, 2003; O’Nell, 
1976; Shulman & Stroumsa, 1999; Tedlock, 1992a).
2. See Blainey (2010) on “entheophilic” and 
“entheophobic” world views; see also Walsh (2007; 
Ch. 24).
3.   “People in the medieval and early modern period 
often saw dreams as communications from God—
or from the Devil. For the ancients, dreams were 
perhaps more like visitations. Dreams might predict 
the future or carry messages” (Pick & Roper, 2004, 
p. 3); see also Parman (1991; Ch. 2-3) and Kruger 
(2005).
4.    For instance, see Herr (1981, p. 334) on fuzzy 
boundaries among Fijians between what Westerners 
call dream, hallucination, and vision; see also 
Merrill (1992) on this issue among the Ramámiru 
of Mexico.
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5.    This is, of course, Jamesian radical empiricism at 
work (Jackson, 1989).
6.       Common to all experience is what Antonio Damasio 
(1999) has called core consciousness that “provides the 
organism with a sense of self about one moment—
now—and about one place—here” (p. 16).
7.     In a few cases, such as among Buddhist and some 
other ethno-psychologies, both states are considered 
equally illusory.
8.      From the Greek for “capable of being demonstrated” 
or “absolutely certain”; see Laughlin (1994a).
9.   See Horton (1982) and Peek (1991) on the African 
drive to know the future by dreaming and other 
forms of divination.
10. Post hoc reasoning, short for the phrase post hoc ergo 
propter hoc (“after this, therefore because of this”) is 
the fallacy of reasoning back from the conclusion 
to causation in the premise. The fallacy is that just 
because B follows A does not mean that A causes B.
11.  Morris, 1982; Radin, 1997a, 1997b, 2006; Puthoff, 
Targ, & May, 1981; Jahn, 1981; Bierman & Radin, 
1997, 1999; Ebon, 1966.
12. Radin, 1997a, 2006; Jahn & Dunne, 1987; Rao, 
2001; Laughlin & Throop, 2008.
13. The world as it exists, independent of any brains 
sensing, experiencing, or knowing it.
14. Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974, Ch. 5; Laughlin, 
McManus & d’Aquili, 1990, p. 43; Laughlin & 
Loubser, 2010; Pinker, 1997; LeDoux, 2003, p. 84; 
Ebbesson, 1984; Carey, 2009, Ch. 3.
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